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Abstract 
 
Are our everyday judgments about the world around us normative? Decades of research in the judgment 
and decision-making literature suggest the answer is 'no'. If people's judgments do not follow normative 
rules, then what rules if any do they follow? Quantum probability theory is a promising new approach to 
modeling human behavior that is at odds with normative, classical rules. One key advantage of using 
quantum theory is that it explains multiple types of judgment errors using the same basic machinery, 
unifying what have previously been thought of as disparate phenomena. In this paper, we test predictions 
from quantum theory related to the co-occurrence of two classic judgment phenomena, order effects and 
conjunction fallacies, using judgments about real world events (related to the US presidential primaries). 
We also show that our data obeys two a priori and parameter free constraints derived from quantum theory. 
Further, we examine two factors that moderate the effects, cognitive thinking style as measured by the 
Cognitive Reflection Test and political ideology. 
 
Key Words: quantum probability theory, order effects, conjunction fallacy, individual differences, 
rationality  
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Introduction 
Everyday we make hundreds of judgments about the world around us (e.g., How likely is it to rain 
tomorrow? How likely is it that Democrats will be the majority in the Senate after the next election?). A 
core question of human behavior is whether people's judgments and decisions can be considered normative. 
That is, do people behave as ideal decision-makers, acting in a fully rational manner? Decades of research 
in human judgment and decision-making suggests that the answer is 'no'. People often make incorrect or 
biased decisions (Kahneman and Tversky, 1972; Tversky and Kahneman, 1975). If people’s judgments 
violate normative rules, then what rules (if any) do they follow? 
In recent years an alternative class of decision making models, based on the mathematics of 
quantum theory, have been developed to model situations where behavior is at odds with the normative 
predictions of classical probability theory (Busemeyer and Bruza, 2012). Cognitive models based on 
quantum probability theory are computational level models, focusing on the principles and representations 
guiding human behavior (c.f. Griffiths et al., 2010). One key advantage of using quantum theory as a 
modeling framework is that it explains multiple types of judgment errors using the same basic machinery, 
unifying what have previously been thought of as disparate phenomena. The ultimate objective is to provide 
a computational level framework for non-normative decision-making, allowing new predictions and a 
greater understanding of why failures of normative prescription arise, something not possible with models 
that treat different non-normative behaviors in isolation. 
In the present work, we examine two classic examples of non-normative judgments: conjunction 
fallacies and order effects. The conjunction fallacy occurs when individuals judge the conjunction of two 
events to be greater than at least one of the constituents (Tversky and Kahneman, 1983). For example, a 
conjunction fallacy occurs when the conjunction ‘tomorrow it will be sunny AND warm’ is judged more 
likely than the single event ‘tomorrow it will be sunny’. Order effects occur when the presentation order of 
evidence influences the perceived likelihood of a hypothesis. A typical finding is that given two pieces of 
evidence, X and Y, where X supports a hypothesis (e.g., starting a new exercise program) and Y does not 
(e.g., maintaining a poor diet), the probability that individuals assign to the hypothesis H (e.g., future weight 
loss) after hearing the evidence in the order X,Y is less than the probability they assign when the evidence is 
presented in the order Y,X (Hogarth and Einhorn, 1992; Trueblood and Busemeyer, 2011).  
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Quantum models account for these two effects through the incompatibility of events. This technical 
term from quantum probability theory means that events do not commute (i.e., pr(X & Y)  ¹ pr(Y & X)). 
Thus, by definition, incompatibility implies the presence of order effects (Trueblood and Busemeyer, 2011; 
Wang and Busemeyer, 2013). Incompatibility has also been used to explain conjunction fallacies 
(Busemeyer et al., 2011). Since both order effects and conjunction fallacies arise from the same underlying 
assumption of incompatibility, one important prediction is that these effects should co-occur; a prediction 
we will test in the present study. In addition, quantum models predict quantitative constraints on the types 
of behavior we expect to see. Specifically, we examine two a priori and parameter free constraints on the 
quantum theory predictions, one for order effects and one for conjunctions. 
To test the quantum model predictions, we examine the normative status of real-world judgments 
about US politics. In our experiment, participants reported their beliefs about the likelihood that five of the 
main candidates for the Republican and Democratic presidential nominations (Ted Cruz, Marco Rubio, 
Donald Trump, Hillary Clinton and Bernie Sanders) would win various combinations of state primaries and 
the ultimate nomination. The overall aim is to understand whether there are non-normative effects in these 
real-world judgments and whether they are consistent with the predictions of quantum theory. We also 
show that individual differences in the degree of non-normative behaviors are associated with cognitive 
thinking style and political ideology.  
Method 
Participants 
The experiment was conducted using the Qualtrics survey platform, with participants recruited via 
Amazon Mechanical Turk. The eligibility criterion was set to allow US residents only, but no other 
restriction was placed on participation. 1200 individuals (624 male) were recruited and paid $1.50 each. As 
described below, each participant answered questions about one of two Democratic candidates (Hillary 
Clinton and Bernie Sanders) and one of three Republican candidates (Ted Cruz, Marco Rubio, Donald 
Trump). The sample size was chosen so that there would be 400 participants for each Republican candidate.  
Materials and Procedure 
The main judgments participants were asked to make concerned the likelihood that a given 
candidate would win various combinations of two chosen primaries and the ultimate party nomination. 
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Questions took one of three forms, either a judgment about a single event such as “How likely do you think 
it is that Ted Cruz will win the primary in Texas?", a conditional such as “Suppose Donald Trump wins the 
primary in Texas. How likely do you think it is that he will then win the nomination to be the Republican 
Presidential candidate?" or a conjunction such as “How likely do you think it is that Bernie Sanders will 
lose the primary in Massachusetts and lose the nomination to be the Democratic Presidential candidate?" 
For each question participants responded on a 17 point Likert scale with verbal labels adapted from 
Windschitl and Wells (1996). For a given candidate there were four blocks of questions, each containing an 
order question (described in more detail below) and various other questions. Questions within a block were 
presented in a random order and the order of blocks was randomized.  
Some of the questions asked participants to make a sequence of decisions about the likelihood a 
candidate would win the nomination as they learned new information about their performance in the 
primaries. For example, they might be asked about the likelihood than Donald Trump would win the 
nomination (N) given that he wins the primary in Texas, (e.g. 𝑝(𝑁|𝑇𝑋)). Participants might then be asked 
to reevaluate Trump’s chances given that he also loses the primary in Virginia (e.g., 𝑝(𝑁|𝑇𝑋, 𝑉𝐴)).  
Information about the outcome of the first primary remained on the computer screen when new information 
about the second primary was presented, so participants had access to this during their subsequent choice.  
The primaries we selected occurred on the same day, the first Super Tuesday of the 2016 US 
Presidential Primaries (3/1/2016); ensuring there was no direct causal link between them (participants were 
made aware of this fact.) This is critically important for testing order effects. If the primaries occurred on 
different days, the results of one could potentially influence the outcome of the other. In this case, order 
effects might be rational. For the Democrats the primaries chosen where Massachusetts (MA) and 
Oklahoma (OK). For the Republican candidates the primaries chosen were Texas (TX) and Virginia (VA).  
After the main part of the task, participants were asked an additional set of questions designed to 
measure individual differences that might relate to a participant’s judgments. Participants first answered a 
version of the Cognitive Reflection Test (CRT) (Frederick, 2005), in the revised form suggested by 
Finucane and Gullion (2010). The CRT is designed to discriminate between participants adopting either a 
more intuitive or a more deliberative thinking style (Toplak et al., 2011). Full details of the questions are 
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given in the supplementary materials.  We expect that this measure will predict the presence and size of 
deviations from normative reasoning.  
Participants then answered a number of questions relating to their political beliefs (these questions were 
asked after the main part of the study in order to avoid biasing responses). Participants were asked whether 
they were affiliated with a political party, and a self reported ideology question (options: Extreme 
Conservative, Moderate Conservative, Moderate, Moderate Liberal, Extreme Liberal). Participants finally 
answered a 10 point Ideological Consistency Scale designed by the Pew Research Centre (2014). This is a 
list of ten pairs of statements and participants must pick the statement from each pair that they most agree 
with. Each pair consists of a statement more typically associated with a Liberal ideology, and one more 
typically associated with a Conservative ideology. Full details of the questions are given in the 
supplementary materials. 
Results 
All subjects were included in the analyses. In the body of this paper we only report Bayesian 
statistical tests performed using JASP (JASP team, 2016), classical versions of all tests can be found in the 
Supplementary Material. The data and the Qualtrics survey code used to collect it are available on the Open 
Science Framework at https://osf.io/ucs8z/  
Order Effects  
To examine the presence of order effects we performed Bayesian paired samples t-tests to test the 
hypothesis that 𝑝(𝑁|𝐴, 𝐵) differs from 𝑝(𝑁|𝐵, 𝐴), where A and B are different possible primaries, e.g. win 
Oklahoma (OK) or lose Texas (TX).  There are two possible order effect comparisons per candidate for a 
total of 10 comparisons across all five candidates. The Bayes Factors (BF) for all ten comparisons were 
greater than 10./, indicating extreme evidence for order effects1. Group average data are presented in 
Figure 1, from which we see the general pattern that the perceived likelihood of a candidate winning the 
nomination N given that they win primary A and lose primary B, 𝑝(𝑁|‘𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑒	𝐵’, ‘𝑤𝑖𝑛	𝐴’), is rated as higher 
on average than 𝑝(𝑁|‘𝑤𝑖𝑛	𝐴’, ‘𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑒	𝐵’). In the language of decision-making this is referred to as a recency 
effect (Hogarth and Einhorn, 1992). These results were confirmed by a Bayesian repeated measures 																																								 																					1	The Bayes Factor BF10 is the ratio of evidence for H1 over H0. BF10 > 1 denotes support for the alternative 
hypothesis and BF10 < 1 support for the null hypothesis.	
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ANOVA examining two factors: Presentation Order and Candidate Pair. The model Presentation Order * 
Candidate Pair was preferred to all other models (BFM > 1000, extreme evidence) and to the null model 
(BF10 > 1000, extreme evidence). The analysis of effects also showed that the Bayes Factor for inclusion of 
the two variables Presentation Order and Candidate pair was very large, BFinclusion > 1000. The analysis of 
effects is shown in Table 1, full details are given in the Supplementary Material. Note that the presence of 
order effects in the data means that it is consistent with the basic assumption of incompatibility in quantum 
probability theory. 
  
Figure 1. Average judgment for each of the candidates and each of the possible win/lose combinations and 
orders. Conditionals involving first a loss and then a win are always given a higher likelihood, suggesting a 
recency effect. The error bars show SE of the mean.  
 
Conjunction Fallacies  
Next we examine the presence of conjunction fallacies. We performed a series of one-sided 
Bayesian paired samples t-tests to test the hypothesis that 𝑝(𝑋 ∧ 𝑌) > 𝑚𝑖𝑛(𝑝(𝑋), 𝑝(𝑌)) where X and Y are 
different possible events such as winning the nomination and losing a particular primary.  
For each candidate we measured eight different conjunctions for a total of 40 comparisons across 
the five candidates. 37 out of the 40 comparisons had BF10 > 12, strong evidence for conjunction fallacies. 
Full details of these tests are given in the Supplementary material. We also plot 𝑝(𝑋 ∧ 𝑌) vs 
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𝑚𝑖𝑛(𝑝(𝑋), 𝑝(𝑌)), averaged across participants in Fig 2a. Since almost all points lie above the diagonal we 
see that almost all conjunctions give rise to a fallacy. In Fig 2b we plot the same conjunctions against 𝑚𝑎𝑥(𝑝(𝑋), 𝑝(𝑌)), which allows us to quickly see that there are no double conjunction fallacies, i.e. 	𝑝 𝑋 ∧ 𝑌 ≤ max 𝑝 𝑋 , 𝑝 𝑌 . This is discussed in more detail below.  
 
Testing the Quantum Constraints 
Quantum theory predicts the following constraint on order effects, which we derive in the 
Supplementary Material:  𝑝 𝑁 𝐵, 𝐴 − 𝑝 𝑁 𝐴, 𝐵 = 𝑝 𝑁 𝐴, 𝐵 − 𝑝 𝑁 𝐵, 𝐴 ,				(1)	 
where N represents a candidate winning the nomination, and A and 𝐴 represent the candidate winning or 
loosing the primary A, respectively. The constraint arises because, at least in the simplest quantum models, 
the conditional probability of N given a sequence of prior events (e.g., A then B) depends only on the 
relationship between N and the final event (e.g., B) in the sequence (mathematically, this relationship is 
quantified by the angle between the two events). In particular, 𝑝 𝑁 … , 𝐴 = cosK(𝜃MN) and 𝑝 𝑁 … , 𝐴 =sinK(𝜃MN), from which Eq.(1) follows. This constraint is very strong in that it is parameter free. 	
 
Figure 2. Mean conjunction judgments plotted against the minimum or maximum conjunct. A) 
Conjunctions plotted against the minimum conjunct, almost all points lie above the diagonal, indicating a 
conjunction fallacy. The dotted lines represent the quantum bounds. B) Conjunctions plotted against the 
maximum conjunct, all points lie below the diagonal, indicating the absence of any double conjunction 
fallacies. The dotted and solid lines represent the quantum bounds.  
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This equality gives rise to five constraints, one for each candidate. We carried out a Bayesian 
repeated measures ANOVA with the left and right hand sides of Eq.(1) as one factor, and candidate type as 
the other. The particular pair of candidates a participant saw was coded as a between-subjects factor. If the 
quantum constraint, Eq.(1), is obeyed, we expect to see no effect of Side, although possibly effects due to 
Candidate Type and Candidate Pair. A model with Candidate Type (Republican or Democrat) was preferred 
to all other models (BFM = 391, extreme evidence) and to the null model (BF10 = 5.07 × 104, extreme 
evidence). The analysis of effects is shown in Table 2, and full details are given in the Supplementary 
Material. It shows that only the effect Candidate Type has a Bayes Factor > 1, representing evidence for 
inclusion. Crucially, there was no support for the inclusion of the variable Side. The data is therefore 
consistent with this constraint arising from the quantum model.  
Quantum theory may also be used to derive constraints on conjunctions. First, regardless of the 
particular model, quantum theory does not permit double conjunction fallacies. The reason for this is that 
while probabilities in quantum theory do not obey all the usual sum rules, they do obey some of them. In 
particular, when the probability for a sequence of events is computed, the final event in the sequence will 
obey the usual sum rules. Therefore given two events, X,Y, the probability sum rules will always be 
satisfied for one of them.  
We tested for the presence of double conjunction fallacies by performing a series of Bayesian 
paired samples t-tests, similar to the tests for regular conjunction fallacies, but where the comparison is now 
between 𝑝(𝑋 ∧ 𝑌) and 𝑚𝑎𝑥(𝑝(𝑋), 𝑝(𝑌)). The full results are given in the Supplementary Material, but all 
Bayes Factors were less that 0.015, indicating very strong evidence for the absence of double conjunction 
fallacies.  
Secondly, quantum theory may be used to derive upper and lower bounds on the probability of the 
conjunction of two events, given their individual probabilities. Full details are given in the Supplementary 
Material, but the intuition is that the joint probability can be written in terms of the conditional 𝑝(𝑌|𝑋), 
which depends only on the angle between X and Y. We can bound this angle if we know the angles between 
X,Y and the initial state vector (the initial state vector represents an individual's beliefs before any questions 
are asked), and these can be determined from 𝑝 𝑋 , 𝑝 𝑌 .   Some algebra shows,  
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𝑝QRS/QUV 𝑋 ∧ 𝑌
= 𝑝 𝑋 𝑝 𝑋 𝑝 𝑌 + 1 − 𝑝 𝑋 1 − 𝑝 𝑌
± 2 𝑝 𝑋 1 − 𝑝 𝑋 𝑝 𝑌 1 − 𝑝 𝑌 																																						(2)		
For example suppose 𝑝(𝑋) = .75 and 𝑝(𝑌) = .25, then quantum theory requires 0.14 ≤ 𝑝(𝑋 ∧ 𝑌) ≤ 0.42. 
In Figs 2a,b we plot the maximum and minimum allowed values of the conjunction, as a function of 𝑚𝑖𝑛(𝑝(𝑋), 𝑝(𝑌)) or 𝑚𝑎𝑥(𝑝(𝑋), 𝑝(𝑌)) respectively. (The maximum value of 𝑝QRS(𝑋 ∧ 𝑌) obtained when 
varying Eq.(2) over 𝑝(𝑌)	is equal to 𝑝(𝑋), so the upper bound in Fig 2b is simply the diagonal.) All points 
lie inside the allowed regions, further adding to our confidence in a quantum explanation for the data.  
 
Co-occurrence of the effects 
So far we have seen that both order effects and conjunction fallacies are present in the data. 
However quantum theory predicts that these effects should co-occur not just for the same stimuli but also in 
the same individuals. To demonstrate this, it is useful to have a single measure of the size of order effects 
and conjunction fallacies committed by a given participant for both the Democratic and Republican 
candidates. For each participant and choice of candidate, we can compute an Order Effect score and a 
Conjunction Fallacy score as follows. Let N denote the event that a given candidate wins the nomination, 
and 𝐴 and 𝐴 the events that a candidate wins or loses the primary A, respectively. The Order effect score we 
computed is given by 
𝑂𝐸 = 1𝜎 |𝑝(𝑁|𝐴, 𝐵) − 𝑝(𝑁|𝐵, 𝐴)| + |𝑝(𝑁|𝐵, 𝐴) − 𝑝(𝑁|𝐴, 𝐵)| 																	(3)	 
for the relevant primaries A and B. This gives an indication of the size of order effects exhibited by each 
participant. Here 𝜎 is the standard deviation of the participant’s responses for all questions about this 
candidate. Dividing by the standard deviation helps to reduce any effects due to participants not using the 
entire response scale. 
The conjunctions we tested involved one primary and the party nomination (e.g., Trump wins TX 
and loses the nomination). The Conjunction Fallacy score we computed is therefore made up of two terms,  
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𝐶𝐹 = 1𝜎 𝑚𝑎𝑥{𝑝(𝑋 ∧ 𝑌) − 𝑝(𝑋),0} + 𝑚𝑎𝑥{𝑝(𝑋 ∧ 𝑌) − 𝑝(𝑌),0}e∈ N,N,g,gh∈{M,M}	 .						(4)		
The first term compares the conjunction to one of the constituent events and the second term compares it to 
the other constituent event. This measure is sensitive both to the number of conjunction fallacies committed 
and to their size. Again 𝜎 is the standard deviation of the participant’s responses for all question about this 
candidate. 
Figure 3 plots the two scores, split up into responses for Democratic (blue points) and Republican 
candidates (red points). We can clearly see that the majority of participants display both order effects and 
conjunction fallacies. We can get additional evidence for the quantum model by examining how it predicts 
the co-occurrence of conjunction fallacies and order effects. To do this we simulated a simple quantum 
model, exhausting the possible parameter space to get an impression of the degree of co-occurrence typical 
in such a model. Full details of the simulations are given in the supplementary materials. Results of the 
simulation are also plotted in Figure 3 (gray points), and we can see that the data for the most part lie within 
the same region as the majority of the simulation results. Together these features provide additional 
evidence for a quantum model of these decisions. 
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Figure 3: Scatter plot of the normalized order effect and conjunction fallacy scores. The red square points 
represent data for Republican candidates and the blue triangle points represent data for Democrat 
candidates. Each point represents one participant. The gray points are the results of model simulations. 
 
Individual Differences  
To check for the effects of CRT and political ideology we ran two Bayesian repeated measures 
ANOVAs with either Order Effect score, Eq.(3), or Conjunction Fallacy Score, Eq.(4), as the repeated 
measures, with CRT and ideology as between-subjects factors. The CRT and 10-pt ideology scales both had 
acceptable reliability (𝛼 = .77 and 𝛼 = .80 respectively2), but to reduce noise and help even out numbers in 
each group, we collapsed the 10-point ideology scale down to a three category ideology score, with 
categories given by ‘Liberal’ (0-3), ‘Moderate’ (4-6), and ‘Conservative’ (7-10). In this section, we also 
collapse results across candidates from the same party.  
For the Order Effect score, a model with Candidate Type (Republican or Democrat) and CRT 
factors was preferred to all other models (BFM = 18.4, strong evidence) and to the null model (BF10 = 185.6, 
extreme evidence). The analysis of effects is shown in Table 3, the full analysis is given in the 
Supplementary Material. It shows that the effect CRT has BFinclusion = 9.9 (moderate evidence). 
For the Conjunction Fallacy score, a model with CRT and Ideology factors was preferred to all 
other models (BFM = 27.8, strong evidence) and to the null model (BF10 = 2.6	×10/, extreme evidence). 
The analysis of effects is shown in Table 4, the full analysis is given in the Supplementary Material. It 
shows that the effect CRT has BFinclusion = 304 (extreme evidence) and Ideology has BFinclusion =3.1 (weak 
evidence).  
The behavior of the Order Effect score and Conjunction Fallacy score with varying CRT and 
Ideology score is shown in Figure 4. Panels A and B show how the Order Effect score varies across 
subgroups with differing Ideology and CRT scores. There is no discernible pattern when grouping by 
Ideology, but a clear trend towards decreasing Order Effect scores with increasing CRT score, in line with 
previous work showing the CRT is associated with more deliberative thinking. Panels C and D show how 
																																								 																					2	These	are	the	values	of	Cronbach’s	alpha	computed	from	our	data	set	in	JASP.		
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the Conjunction Fallacy score varies across subgroups with differing Ideology and CRT scores. There is a 
clear trend towards decreasing Conjunction Fallacy scores with increasing CRT scores, as expected if those 
with higher CRT score are more deliberative. For the Democrat candidates the Conjunction Fallacy score is 
lowest for those identifying as liberal, while for Republican candidates the scores are lower for those 
identifying as conservative. Scores for both candidates are higher for those whose political ideology is 
moderate. One interpretation is that those with strong political beliefs may be more deliberative when 
answering these questions, especially when it comes to their preferred candidate. 
We note briefly that our sample of mTurk participants is unlikely to be representative of the US 
population as a whole. The proportion of participants classified as ‘Liberal,’ ‘Moderate,’ and ‘Conservative’ 
was 54.0%, 28.2% and 17.8% respectively. Likewise, the proportion of participants scoring 0,1,2 or 3 in the 
CRT was 15.8%, 22.1%, 25.3% and 36.8% respectively, the reverse of the original study of Frederick 
(2005) where the majority of participants had low scores. This may affect the generalizability of the 
individual differences analysis (Simons et al. in press), and it would be interesting in particular to examine 
how the results here replicate in a more ideologically representative sample. 
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Figure 4. Plots of the Order Effect and Conjunction Fallacy Scores. These are plotted as the difference from 
the mean taken across CRT or Ideology categories, removing any main effect of candidate type. Error bars 
show SE of the mean.  
 
Alternative Models 
 The key advantage of quantum models of non-normative behavior is that they unite what have often 
been thought of as disparate phenomena. As far as we are aware, no other models explain both order effects 
and conjunction fallacies as arising from the same underlying processes. Thus a direct model comparison is 
difficult. However we can take each effect separately and ask whether alternative models can account for 
the patterns of behavior observed.  
 A popular model of order effects is the belief adjustment model due to Hogarth & Einhorn (1992).  
In this model belief in a proposition is updated on receiving new evidence in a way that depends on the 
strength of the evidence relative to some reference point. The key challenge for any alternative model of 
order effects is to reproduce the order effect constraint in Eq(1). In the supplementary material we prove 
this constraint is not obeyed by either common version of the belief adjustment model except under special 
conditions, essentially that a candidate winning or losing a primary has an equal and opposite effect on the 
belief about the nomination. Such conditions are unlikely in the present study, e.g. if a candidate is judged a 
priori unlikely to win a particular primary such a loss will likely have little effect on belief about the 
eventual nomination, however an unexpected win would likely greatly increase belief in the probability of 
winning the nomination.  
 There are a number of alternative heuristic models that can account for conjunction fallacies, but a 
recent quantitative model of interest is the probability theory plus noise model of Costello and Watts 
(2014). In this model noise in the process of retrieving exemplars means that the expected value of a 
person’s probability judgment 𝑝m 𝑋  is squeezed towards ½, with a larger degree of noise and thus 
squeezing for conjunctions compared to single events, because these are more complex. The overall effect 
is that the expected value for the probability of a conjunction is squeezed such that it may become greater 
than one or both of the constituent events, giving a conjunction fallacy.  
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 A key observation is that conjunction fallacies are only possible in this model if at least one of the 
constituent events has probability < 1/2. With some algebra, given in full in the supplementary materials, 
we can show, 
𝑝m 𝑋 ∧ 𝑌 ≤ min 𝑝m 𝑋 , 𝑝m 𝑌 , 𝑖𝑓 min 𝑝m 𝑋 , 𝑝m 𝑌 > 12,																			(5) 
a constraint not satisfied in the data, see Figure 2a. We conclude that the probability plus noise model is 
unable to account for the data presented here. 
 Thus, it is unclear that alternative models can account for the patterns of data observed even when 
considering the two effects separately. 
  
Conclusion 
The value of quantum models lies in their unification of disparate non-normative behaviors. In this 
paper we tested two a priori and parameter free predictions of the quantum model, one for order effects and 
one for conjunction fallacies. The data are in good agreement with both, as well as validating the reasonable 
but previously untested prediction that these effects should co-occur.  This gives us confidence in a 
quantum theoretic explanation for these violations of normative decision-making. The results from the 
analysis of individual differences show performance on the CRT is a good predictor of deviations from 
normative behavior. In addition, ideology score is a good predictor of the size and frequency of conjunction 
fallacies, although not of order effects. Overall these results add to a growing body of evidence that 
quantum models of judgment and decision-making are valuable tools for modeling human behavior. 
The theoretical appropriateness of the quantum analysis is predicated on the idea that the events 
considered, winning the individual primaries and winning the relevant nomination, are incompatible in the 
minds of participants, and must be considered sequentially. Incompatibility cannot be assessed directly, and 
instead must be inferred from the presence of quantum-like behavioral effects (in particular, order effects). 
The key contribution of the present study is that we have taken a first step beyond this approach – the 
presence of one effect can be used to infer incompatibility, which can then be used to predict the presence 
of another effect. While incompatibility remains an empirical question, we hope this approach leads to 
improved predictive power for the quantum approach. 
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Table 1. Analysis of Effects for the Bayesian repeated measures ANOVA testing for Order Effects. 
Candidate Pair and Presentation Order are the repeated measures 
 
 
 
Table 2. Analysis of Effects for the Bayesian repeated measures ANOVA of the Order Effect constraint, 
with Candidate Type and the two Sides of the constraint as the repeated measures  
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Table 3. Analysis of Effects for the Bayesian repeated measures ANOVA of Order Effect scores, with 
 
Candidate Type as the repeated measure  
Effects BFInclusion 
Candidate Type 2.75 
CRT 9.94 
Ideology 0.23 
Candidate Type * CRT 0.03 
Candidate Type * Ideology 0.08 
CRT * Ideology 0.02 
Candidate Type * CRT * Ideology  4.81	×10op 
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Table 4. Analysis of Effects for the Bayesian repeated measures ANOVA of Conjunction Fallacy scores, 
with Candidate Type as the repeated measure.  
 
  Effects BFInclusion 
Candidate Type     0.16 
CRT 304.30 
Ideology     3.12 
Candidate Type * CRT     0.05 
Candidate Type * Ideology     0.24 
CRT * Ideology     0.01 
Candidate Type * CRT * Ideology  2.81	×10oq 
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